Versions Compared

Key

  • This line was added.
  • This line was removed.
  • Formatting was changed.

...

  • Key takeaways BSC meeting

    • Standardized communication for maps from UM to KM
      • Good to have a map level spec around map and data types
      • Vicky: How useful outside of L3AF? Would be good to have a de-facto standard.
      • Agree, standards would be helpful.
      • Louis: Create sub-project to write documents?
      • Karan:  Does this change for Windows?
      • Dave: Believe the answer is no.
        • Both use libBPF
    • Gatekeeping, security and public repository
      • Different types of signing.
      • Just because a program is in a public repo - it would be dangerous to install
      • Have a private repo and the only thing that pulls from a public repo is one that is trusted by admin
      • This isn't like an app store - this is kernel stuff
      • Karan: Could we allow only trusted sources to put stuff into a public repo
      • Dave: That would not change the security situation because trust is not transitive.
      • Karan: Could we have a hybrid model?
      • Dave: The BSC might go along with this, but I don't recommend it.
      • Vicky: Experience does not bear out trusting public repositories.
        • Incredibly rife with situations where security issues arise. We need the possibility for people to have private models
        • If we don't set up the pubilc repo then someone else will. We should do it so that we can at least have some safeguards for security.
        • At the same time users should do their own testing and evaluation.
      • Karan: Maybe it makes sense to include this in the KF writeup.
        • If we could set up L3AFd with a secure and an unsecure mode. Public repos would have more checks.
      • Vicky: Like the idea of secure and insecure mode. Default - always in secure mode. Will not pull from public repos.
        • If you want to pull from public then you have to go insecure
      • Dave: Why even have an insecure mode? Just don't let them do that.
      • Dave: What if there was identity verification to contrib to public repo?
      • Karan: How do we guardrail that?
        • Allow contribs only from trusted sources?
        • Some process to become a trusted source.
        • Even there if someone tries to pull from a public repo then have extra checks.
      • Vicky: Generally in favor of checks and balances for listing something in public repo.
        • The reality is that this is a huge burden. Who does this? Who is responsible for it?
      • Dave: If there are 100 eBPF programs submitted, who will decide which is trusted and which is not.
      • Dave: Is there liability involved? Pure reputation based repo manages itself. Will likely have more contribs.
      • Karan: Trusted source, but we recommend testing.
      • Vicky: Lawyers always say that there is risk. How do other repos handle legal risk?
        • Being under the LFN will give us access to legal assistance.
      • Karan: What do we agree on?
        • Get the PR updated with calling out the risks that we are aware of.
        • Take the first step into creating this eBPF repo.
      • Vicky: Should we form a WG around the marketplace?
        • Wary of work on the marketplace blocking work on L3AFd.
      • Karan: Thoughts on creating a WG?
        • Dave: Yes, I agree that the 2 topics are separable.
    • How do we handle other programs that might load eBPF and block L3AFd?
      • Do we block that?
      • Especially with XDP or TC. L3AF loads the root program and it loads the other programs in the desired sequence
        • Someone with privileges could load a new program and attach to XDP. Then the L3AF program would not work.
        • We don't currently block them.
      • Dave: Can you have SeLinux functionality to control things?
      • Karan: This is more of an eBPF foundation question than a L3AFp question.
      • Dave: Windows allows multiple programs to attach to XDP. Linux allows only one.
      • Kran: We could detect that the root program has been unloaded. We can't prevent it.
      • Jason: At least you would know.
      • Dave: Prevent would need a kernel change. Detection wouldn't.
      • Vicky: Bring this to the eBPF BSC? What i the process?
      • Dave: Is the eBPF foundation or the Linux kernel the right place to solve this problem.
      • Dave: Which is more appropriate?
        • Karan: add an API to BPFtool. 
        • Each tool could write their own process.
      • Vicky: XDP and TC. In the XDP case this is not cross-plat.
      • Dave: Windows does not have tc yet. Windows would likely be able to attach multiple progs to tc (When we build tc)
      • Vicky: This is a Linux problem so it's a Linux problem
      • Dave: Must submit a PR and/or show up at office hours.
        • Process is actually easier than the BSC.
      • Vicky: 2 probs: Detection and prevention. Can be worked on in parallel.
    • How are we different from bumblebee?
      • Karan: Very different.
        • Bumblebee is for writing kprobes or tracepoints
        • They don't do BPF chaining.
        • They don't support XDP.
      • Dave: Bumblebee also submited an eBPF.io project
        • How do we make the 2 descriptions different?
      • Karan: I can write a few lines on how L3AF is different from Bumblebee.
      • Dave: Bumblebee is a command line system, L3AFd is an orchestration system.
        • Also workflow is different
      • Karan: If you just want kprobe or tracepoint you could already do it with 1 line of bash.
        • The complexity comes from running chaining progs, maps, ect.
      • Dave: Bumblebee must use an OCI package.
      • Dave: L3AF has an agent and orchestrator. Bumblebee does not. Add to description.
      • Jason: Bumblebee has no agent or control system so that you can shift the order of programs.

Action Items

  •  LJ Illuzzihave draft working documents ready for LFN Induction meeting on 02/01, including proposed timeline

...