



SEcure DIstributed IoT ManagemENT (SEDIMENT) for OPS-5G

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Outline

- SEDIMENT Remote Attestation (RA)
- SEDIMENT RA protocol framework
- IETF Remote Attestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture
- SEDIMENT transition to a Linux Foundation project
- Engagement with LF 5G Super Blueprint
 - Use case #1
 - Use case #2
- Next steps
- Q/A


SEDIMENT Remote Attestation (RA)

RA goals


- Detect presence of malware and software tampering
- Verify IOT device configuration integrity
- Authenticate
- Operate across the entire scale of devices on a 5G network

Key RA components

- A protocol (cf. next slide) that supports
 - Authentication and authorization among communicating entities
 - Flexibility in requesting various types of evidences for attestation
 - E.g., firmware fingerprint; process status
- Hardware/software/hybrid Root of Trust (RoT) that ensures the integrity of RA protocol execution [1]
 - Protection of attestation credentials
 - Exclusive access
 - No leaks
 - Safe execution in a protected region
 - Execution atomicity (cannot be interrupted)
 - Immutability (attestation code and everything it depends on cannot be altered after being loaded)
 - Controlled invocation (run attestation code in its entirety)



[1] Karim Eldefrawy, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, and Gene Tsudik. 2017. HYDRA: HYbrid Design for Remote Attestation (Using a Formally Verified Microkernel). *WiSec '17*.



Pairing:

- Prover authenticates itself to Relying Party and acquires Verifier connection information

Attestation:

- Prover initiates attestation, *instead of continuously keeping a communication channel open waiting to be attested, with significant energy savings.*
- Verifier can issue a variety of challenges to request Prover to produce evidences.
- Authentication digests signed with the shared key enables both parties to authenticate.
- Verifier evaluates evidence. Either grants a passport to Prover or sends an Alert to Relying Party. Prover must restart the procedure after some time if it does not get expected positive response from Verifier.

Join:

- Prover submits granted passport to the Relying Party to gain permission to communicate.


Report:

- IoT device sends application data after Passport has been accepted.

IETF RATS WG Architecture


<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9334/>

SEDIEMENT RA is being aligned with RATS, following Passport model




Conceptual Information Flow

- Relying Party:** Network equipment for network access admission; Server holding confidential data for release; Entity that needs trustworthiness of remote elements
- Evidence:** Claims about the target environment
- Reference Values:** Values used in appraising evidences
- Endorsements:** Statements that help authenticating device info



Passport Model



Background Check Model

SEDIMENT Transition: Linux Foundation Project

- “SEDIMENT, a Series of LF Projects” has been set up with the following mission statement:
 - “to provide open-source software implementing a distributed and scalable security architecture with remote attestation for networked IoT devices”
- Documents have been adopted/executed by LF and Peraton Labs:
 - Technical Charter, Series Agreement, and Contributor’s Agreement (word mark transfer)
- Project supporters including one LF member:
 - NIWC (LF member), DARPA, Peraton Labs, UCI, Kryptowire Labs, Aarno Labs, USC/ISI
- Apache v2.0 License for code and CC-BY-4.0 for documentation chosen
- Code and documentation released by DARPA DISTAR and Peraton
- Repositories for code and webpages: <https://github.com/sediment-lfproject>
- LF Project public announcement on February 22nd, 2023

- Develop use cases for RA in collaboration with Muddasar Ahmed and Ranny Haiby
 - Ensure that IoT devices on a network are authentic and have not been tampered with
 - Ensure that IoT devices can be seamlessly maintained and securely updated
- Develop and integrate SEDIMENT RA onto existing 5G SBP lab infrastructure as proof of concept of ways to realizing 5G SBP use cases

- Insure that IoT devices on a network are authentic and have not been tampered with. This is particularly sensitive in remote areas that are not often frequented by people.

- How would remote attestation help?
 - RAVerifier is set to periodically "inspect" remote cameras by checking their firmware fingerprint.
 1. RAVerifier confirms that the firmware fingerprint of Remote Camera A is authentic and permits/allows the camera to stay on the network.
 2. RAVerifier determines that the firmware fingerprint of Remote Camera B is not authentic. RAVerifier then alerts Relying Party (e.g., firewall) to deny Remote Camera B access on the network.

5G SBP Use Case - Remote Attestation Use Case I - IoT Device Security and Authentication

- Ensure that firmware of IoT devices can be seamlessly maintained and securely updated, especially when IoT devices are deployed at scale.

- How would remote attestation help?
 - With a hardware/software co-design, RA Prover enforces software immutability and prevents unauthorized updates.
 1. Unauthorized software updates on Remote Camera C triggers its MCU reset.
 2. Secure updates issued by RA Verifier to Remote Camera D as the sole means of software updates.

5G SBP Use Case - Remote Attestation Use Case 2- IoT Device Onboarding & Maintenance

Next Steps

- Continue use case refinement with the working group and update draft on the LF 5G SBP site.